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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSAn endangered speciesDavid A. Fullerton, MDI am indebted to many people for the opportunity to be a tho-
racic surgeon. First and foremost, I thank my family. My
parents, Peggy and Charles, met as undergraduates at the
University of Colorado and will celebrate their 58th wed-
ding anniversary in September 2009. They taught me the im-
portance of responsibility, perseverance, and hard work. I
am grateful for the support they gave me as a student trying
to go to medical school. My wife’s parents, Neill and Miriam
Farrington, have been an inspiration and strong role models.
They will celebrate their 59th wedding anniversary in Octo-
ber. I am particularly grateful to my wife, Chris. Chris and I
met as teenagers and have been married since the beginning
of medical school. As my love and my best friend, she has
always provided unwavering support and has been the bed-
rock of our family. Our sons, Patrick and Danny, have been
incredibly understanding of the demands that our profession
places on any family.
I have benefited from priceless mentorship throughout my
professional career. When I was a surgical resident at the
University of Washington, Drs Tom Marchioro and Jim Car-
rico taught me the importance of being intellectually honest
with myself to improve as a surgeon. Both were truly gifted
surgical educators. Despite the rigors of their own careers,
they made the education of residents their highest priority.
Dr Marv Pomerantz (Figure 1, A) has been my friend and
confidant for almost 20 years. Marv provides an excellent
example for all to follow and inspires those around him to
be the best they can be. His sage and calming advice is al-
ways welcome. Dr Fred Grover (Figure 1, B) has been an ex-
cellent role model with an unwavering commitment to the
education of students and residents. He is the most patient
and kind person I have ever met and is able to find the
best of any situation and the best in people. The world needs
more people like Fred. Like everyone who has ever worked
with him, I wanted to be like Dr Alden Harken (Figure 1, C).
His intellect, energy, charisma, and humor have combined to
make him the world’s greatest surgical educator. His passion
for academic surgery has launched the careers of hundreds of
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4 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgerof those around him makes his friends and followers in-
tensely loyal to him. He is one of the finest academic sur-
geons of our time. I owe him a great deal for the
opportunities that he gave me.
I have always had the privilege of working with truly tal-
ented colleagues and great residents. I have personally
learned a great deal from working with them, and I thank
them all.THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC ACTION
History teaches many valuable lessons for the present.
One such lesson is that strategic action is required in difficult
times. Such was the case in 1776, during the early phase of
the American Revolution.1
The war started gloriously for the Americans. In the
spring of 1775, the colonists routed the British at Lexington
and Concord and claimed victory at Bunker Hill. Thereafter,
the new Continental Army led by George Washington kept
the British isolated in Boston with a successful siege for 6
months. Washington was victorious in the siege of Boston
through a brilliant move of military strategy. He dispatched
Henry Knox to retrieve abandoned artillery from Fort Ticon-
deroga in upstate New York and then secretly moved the
cannon onto the Dorchester Heights, now part of South Bos-
ton. This gave the Americans military control of the city of
Boston and forced the most powerful military force on earth
to evacuate Boston by ship on March 17, 1776. Washington
correctly anticipated that the British would next attack the
city of New York. He therefore rapidly mobilized his forces
to race to New York to arrive before the British.
Bolstered by their victory at Boston, the colonists were
flush with pride and overconfidence. Washington’s men
were cheered by the population, and legions of volunteers
joined the Continental Army as it crossed the countryside
en route to New York. While waiting in New York for the
arrival of the British, Washington’s army felt invincible
and was eager to engage the British on Manhattan Island.
But this glory was short-lived. With the arrival of 200 British
warships in New York harbor in August 1776, the British
gained control of the surrounding geography. By the end
of August, the British had routed the Americans on Long Is-
land; 2 weeks later, on September 14, 1776, the Americans
were forced to evacuate New York City and Manhattan Is-
land. The battles for New York were a disaster for the colo-
nists. Nonetheless, knowing that the British would next
move to take Philadelphia, Washington gathered his remain-
ing troops and forced them to move as quickly as possible to
protect that city.y c January 2010
FIGURE 1. A, Marv Pomerantz, MD; B, Fred Grover, MD; C, Alden Harken, MD.
Fullerton Presidential AddressIt seemed that the American Revolution would come to an
end. Not only was the American army demoralized, but the
defeat of the Americans at New York brought despair to the
colonies. Assuming that the British would win the war,
many prominent citizens renounced their allegiance to the
patriots and signed oaths of loyalty to England. Included
in this group were several members of the first Continental
Congress. For a time, it seemed that the state of Maryland
would renounce the Declaration of Independence. Ameri-
cans turned away from the cause, and hundreds of American
soldiers deserted daily.
The British pursued the American army as it retreated
from New York southward through New Jersey. In so doing,
the British conquered the territory they covered. By the end
of November 1776, the British controlled all of New Jersey.
The only thing that separated them from Philadelphia was
the Delaware River. With the British in pursuit, and his
army dwindling, Washington escaped New Jersey by cross-
ing the Delaware River into Pennsylvania on December 8,
1776. Brilliantly, he took all the boats on the New Jersey
side of the river with him as he crossed the river. Knowing
that the odds were very much against him, he did everything
possible to position his army between the British and the city
of Philadelphia. The British were confident that they had
broken the back of the rebels. Unable to cross the Delaware
River without boats, the British army halted their advance in
New Jersey and hoped that the Delaware River would freeze
so that they could then take Philadelphia. The American rev-
olutionary cause was near extinction.
December 1776 was a desperate time. Washington’s ex-
hausted army was starving, naked, and demoralized. The
commissions of those soldiers who had not already deserted
were set to expire 3 weeks hence on January 1, 1777. Very
few indicated an intention to reenlist, and there were even
fewer new recruits; Washington would have no army in
a matter of days. The population had lost faith in the cause
of the revolution and acquiesced to British rule. Washington
knew that soon the Delaware River would be frozen, allow-The Journal of Thoracic anding the British troops to cross easily to take Philadelphia. At
that juncture, the Americans would be defeated.
The Americans were clearly at a point when the Revolu-
tion could fail. Considering his options, Washington decided
that he must do something differently. He rejected the advice
of his council to continue his retreat further into central
Pennsylvania in the hope of attracting more recruits. Instead,
he chose to be proactive. He made the astonishing and bold
decision to divide his small force and to attack the British. I
have come to believe that Washington came to this particular
decision in large part because he recognized that unless he
changed his course of action, he was doomed. Acknowledg-
ing his predicament, he chose to take the situation head-on
and with an eye toward the future. This allowed him to de-
termine the details of his situation and to recognize that he
actually had necessary strengths. He recognized that the
Germans mercenaries stationed at Trenton arrogantly
thought that the Americans were no longer capable of put-
ting up a fight. He knew that the British were so overconfi-
dent that they chose the comforts of the town of Princeton,
away from the front. And he knew that on Christmas night,
his opponents would be drunk and sleeping after their feast-
ing.
On Christmas night of 1776, he shuttled his is army of
2000 men, along with horses and cannon, back across the
Delaware River and defeated the British at the Battle of
Trenton. This victory gave a renewed sense of hope to the
Americans. Thousands of men enlisted in the army, and
once again the citizens believed in the cause. This strategic
action was arguably the turning point of the war, and of
American history.
THE SITUATION IN THORACIC SURGERY TODAY
Today, it is thoracic surgical education that is in a difficult
situation. I believe that we in thoracic surgery have arrived at
a time in our history when we must act, and act now.
Like the American Revolution, thoracic surgical educa-
tion had a glorious beginning. Thoracic surgery was theCardiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 1 5
FIGURE 2. Since 2002, number of institutions with thoracic surgical res-
idency programs has decreased by more than 20%. A, Institutions with tho-
racic surgical residency programs in 2002. B, Institutions with thoracic
surgical residency programs in 2009.
Presidential Address Fullertonnext new thing, and everyone wanted to do it. Competition
for thoracic surgical residency positions was keen; only
the best and the brightest surgical residents were chosen.
In any given hospital, the thoracic residents were the best
doctors in the hospital. Not long ago, pictures of the thoracic
surgical chief residents at Massachusetts General Hospital
even hung in the lobby.
No more. Today, as said by Winston Churchill during
World War II, ‘‘the news from the front is bad.’’ We recog-
nize our situation. We in thoracic surgery have had a growing
sense of despair. As the threats to our specialty have progres-
sively become tangible over the past decade, we have gone
through Ku¨bler-Ross’s stages of grief: denial, anger, bar-
gaining, and depression. I now fear that we have been desen-
sitized to our situation and have reached the fatal level of
acceptance of our fate.
We are all familiar with the data: the number of applicants
to Thoracic Surgical residencies has fallen steadily since
1995. This year, in fact, there were 97 total applicants for
118 positions, and only 67 were graduates of U.S. medical
schools. The thoracic surgical resident is now an endangered
species, and if this trend continues, it will become extinct.
The decline in thoracic surgical residents has in turn led to
a loss in the number of institutions with thoracic surgical
training programs, down more that 20% since 2002 (Fig-
ure 2). This represents an erosion and ultimate loss of the
infrastructure needed for thoracic surgical education. Once
this infrastructure is gone, it will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to regenerate. In my opinion, the endanger-
ment of the thoracic surgical resident is the single greatest
threat to our entire specialty.
Many reasons have been put forward to explain our en-
dangerment. Professional reimbursement has changed, sug-
gesting to some that that society no longer values what we
do. New technologies may now be used to treat diseases
of the chest, and our specialty lacks the skills necessary to
embrace the technologies. Student debt is excessive. People
don’t want operations, and some infer the end of days for
surgery. The job market is tight. Although there is certainly
some truth to each of these statements, I think that it has be-
come all too easy to use them as excuses.
In my opinion, these factors and others must be acknowl-
edged, and we must take them head-on. But these same fac-
tors apply to all specialties. They are not unique to thoracic
surgery, yet it is specifically the thoracic surgical resident
that is endangered. In fact, while the number of first-year
thoracic surgical residents decreased 24% between 2002
and 2007, the corresponding numbers increased by 15%
in plastic surgery, 21% in urology, 31% in vascular surgery,
and 52% in neurosurgery.2
We in thoracic surgery must begin to take responsibility
for this situation and to act proactively. To attribute our
problems to someone else or to circumstances that we sim-
ply cannot control is the hallmark of defeat. We have dedi-6 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgercated our professional careers to the greatest field in all of
medicine, and we have arrived at a turning point. We must
act now.THE GREAT IRONY
I find this decline in thoracic surgery applicants to be
ironic. Thoracic Surgery will certainly change, but it is not
going away. The facts of the matter are these. First, the num-
ber of Thoracic Surgical procedures continues to grow. Sec-
ond, by all accounts, a shortage of thoracic surgeons is on the
immediate horizon.
First, the surgical data. It is true that during the past de-
cade, the number of coronary artery bypass grafting opera-
tions has decreased by approximately 25% nationally.
Medicare claims data indicate that this trend has slowed sig-
nificantly during the last 6 years, however, suggesting that
the decline in bypass volumes may be ending. At the same
time, the number of aortic valve operations has increased
by 28%. The number of mitral valve operations has in-
creased by 24%. The number of pulmonary resections has
increased by 25%. The number of aortic procedures hasy c January 2010
Fullerton Presidential Addressrisen by 28%. The number of mechanical assist devices is up
at least 100%. With the exception of coronary artery bypass
grafting, billing for virtually every thoracic surgical Current
Procedural Terminology code has increased in volume dur-
ing the past 5 years.3-6
Yes, the case mix of thoracic surgical practice does look
different, but these changes offer exciting opportunities for
continued growth. Furthermore, advances in the molecular
therapies of thoracic malignancies will almost certainly in-
crease the number of pulmonary and esophageal resections
by converting the unresectable into the resectable. New en-
dovascular techniques have already expanded the ability to
treat diseases of the thoracic aorta. Clearly there is plenty
of work to do, and it seems to be growing.
Second, all workforce projections suggest a significant
undersupply of thoracic surgeons within the next 10 years.3
According to the Association of American Medical Col-
leges, more than 50% of currently practicing thoracic sur-
geons are older than 55 years, and at least 15% are older
than 65 years. Survey data from the Society for Thoracic
Surgery and American Association of Thoracic Surgeons
strongly imply that more than half of the currently practicing
thoracic surgical workforce will retire within the next 12
years.3,4
The seriousness of this decline is exacerbated by the fact
that the population is aging. Thoracic surgical diseases tend
to increase in prevalence with age. In 2010, approximately
13% of the U.S. population will be older than 65 years.
By 2030, this figure will grow to 20%.4 Thus the demand
for thoracic surgical procedures will continue to grow.
With the need for thoracic surgeons strong, growing, and
projected to grow even more as the populations ages, all
workforce projections predict a significant shortage of tho-
racic surgeons within the next 10 years.
So not only is there plenty of work to do, with the amount
of work growing, but there will soon be no one left to do it.
The economic laws of supply and demand suggest that mar-
ket forces will dictate rising professional opportunities for
those practicing thoracic surgery as the workforce shrinks.
Today is the perfect time to get in. These data should be
seen as a tremendous opportunity for young physicians.
Why, then, are so few interested in pursuing it?
WHY NOT THORACIC SURGERY?
To answer this question, I think we need to take a hard
look in the mirror. In my opinion, there are 3 major reasons.
First, thoracic surgery is hard. I am reminded of a conversa-
tion that I recently had with a medical student, who scrubbed
in during a valve operation. At the end of the procedure, I
asked the student what he thought. ‘‘That was the coolest
thing I have ever seen,’’ he exclaimed. Postoperatively, as
we sat together in the intensive care unit talking about the pa-
tient’s physiology, I said ‘‘Have you thought about being
a heart surgeon?’’ He replied, ‘‘I don’t think so—it’s tooThe Journal of Thoracic andmuch work. It’s too hard’’. Without thinking, I reflexively
responded to him with the lines spoken by the actor Tom
Hanks in the movie A League of Their Own. I said, ‘‘It’s sup-
posed to be hard. If it wasn’t hard, everyone would do it. The
hard is what makes it great.’’ Thoracic surgery is hard, and in
my opinion we need to stop apologizing for that. The truth of
the matter is that it has always been hard–this is nothing new.
If anything, it is easier today than ever. The inherent nature
of thoracic surgery lies in dealing with difficult problems,
and it will therefore always be hard. Despite recognition of
the rigors of thoracic surgery, unfortunately, our collective
approach has been to try to water down the specialty to avoid
this criticism. The right people to do our specialty are out
there. Somehow, we’ve begun to act like victims and to
wait for applicants to come to us. Instead, we need proac-
tively to seek out and find the right people.
Second, there is strong evidence that thoracic surgical ed-
ucation in its current form is not working well. There is
widespread dissatisfaction with the product of our residency
programs among thoracic surgical faculties. These subjec-
tive feelings are supported by the data. The recent perfor-
mances of the graduates of our programs on the qualifying
and the certifying examinations given by American Board
of Thoracic Surgery have been poor. For each of the last 4
years, at least 20% have failed the written examination.
Among those who passed the written examination and
went on to take the oral examination, nearly 30% have failed
in each of the last 3 years. This year, 31% of those taking the
oral examination for the first time failed. When speaking of
such Board score performance as a parameter of the quality
of Thoracic Surgical education, it is easy to blame the stu-
dents. I actually think, however, that it reflects more on the
teachers than on the students. This speaks to the third reason,
which is the most important.
As Winston Churchill said, ‘‘We occasionally stumble
over the truth, but most of us pick ourselves up and hurry
off as if nothing had happened.’’ At the core of the problem
is the fact that we collectively have lost our moral compass
as teachers. It has become far too easy in too many programs
to view the thoracic surgical resident more as an indentured
servant than as a student and a future colleague. Years ago,
Dr Shumway said, ‘‘The hardest thing about cardiac surgery
is getting to do it.’’ Judging by the research presented at last
year’s meeting in Hawaii by John Doty, this statement holds
more truth today than ever.7
The teachers of thoracic surgery are the ‘‘keepers of the
flame’’ of the specialty. We should be the champions of
the future generation of surgeons. Sadly, the feedback
from our residents about the job we are doing as teachers
of thoracic surgery is disheartening. Associated with the de-
cline in the number of thoracic surgical applicants, the feed-
back from those residents who have entered thoracic surgical
residencies has been damning. Surveys conducted by the
Thoracic Surgery Resident Association have indicated thatCardiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 1 7
Phenotype Change
FIGURE 3. When external force of competition is sufficiently large, it will
threaten enterprise viability. In turn, enterprise must change how it does
business to maintain its viability. In other words, it must change its pheno-
type.
Presidential Address Fullertonas many as 70% of respondents believed that the program
director did not help them in finding a job. Forty percent
said that they would choose a different program. More
than 25% of thoracic surgical residents said that they would
choose a different career. Fifty-two percent said that they
would not recommend cardiothoracic surgery to potential
resident applicants.8,9 Because our residents that should be
the greatest pride of our profession, and therefore the best
advertisements for our residency programs, it should be no
surprise that applications are falling. I believe residents’
lack of enthusiasm is the root cause of the declining appli-
cant pool. Why would anyone choose a specialty in which
the current residents did not feel supported, were demoral-
ized for 2 to 3 years, and then went on to fail their Boards?
In his book How the Mighty Fall,10 Jim Collins described
the characteristics of great enterprises that fail. He contrasted
these with the actions of those enterprises that prevent them-
selves from failing. He has found that the road to failure be-
gins with the loss of an understanding of the factors that
created success in the first place and of what it takes to re-
main successful. Instead, success becomes regarded ‘‘as an
entitlement.’’ In other words, failure begins with the loss
of a corporate moral compass. His research further indicated
that the decline of an enterprise is typically self-inflicted;
however, great enterprises do have the capacity to self-cor-
rect. When poised to fall, they can prevent failure and in
some cases recover to become even greater that they had
once been. In my opinion, these principles apply to thoracic
surgical education.
STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINT
Not only must we collectively regain our moral compass,
we must reengineer the way we train people to be thoracic
surgeons. For a long time, the essence of thoracic surgery
has remained fairly constant. But as Andrew Grove11 wrote,
‘‘Sooner or later something fundamental in your business
world will change.’’ This process of change has been man-
ifest in industry forever. Successful enterprises must be able
to see and understand such changes to adapt. When the en-
vironment changes, an organism, company, or surgical spe-
cialty must change its phenotype to survive. Failure to do so
leads to extinction.
Whether in nature, the corporate world, or a surgical spe-
cialty, it is ultimately forces of competition that drive the
changes in the phenotype of an enterprise. Thirty years
ago, Porter12 described the major competitive forces that
are exerted on a business enterprise that force a phenotypic
change.
According to Porter,12 a business enterprise is subjected to
external forces such as the vigor of a business competitor or
the viability of a business supplier. All corporate entities
must reach some steady state as these forces are balanced.
If one or more of these external forces reaches sufficient
magnitude, it threatens the viability of the enterprise.8 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular SurgerWhen this happens, the enterprise must change the way
that it does business, its phenotype, to remain viable (Fig-
ure 3). The mechanisms by which this process of transition
from one phenotype to the next occurs determine whether
the enterprise thrives.
In his book Only the Paranoid Survive, Andrew
Grove11 describes this transition process from the old
way of doing business to the new as a ‘‘strategic inflection
point.’’ He describes this as a time in the life of an enter-
prise when its fundamentals are about to change. After this
change, the enterprise will either flourish or fail. Accord-
ing to Grove, such a strategic inflection point leads to
a full-scale change in the way that the enterprise conducts
its business. Grove also notes that it is difficult to know
just when a strategic inflection point occurs, even in retro-
spect. The recognition may take place in stages. As Grove
indicated, first, there is a sense that something is different.
Customers treat you differently. Trade shows are weird.
Competitors who you once ignored take business from
you. When the early signs of a strategic point are noted,
one can’t be sure that they are necessarily important.11
At some point, however, the existence of the strategic in-
flection point is incontrovertible.
Whether an enterprise lives or dies after a strategic inflec-
tion point is determined by how it manages this transition.
Because it is by definition difficult to know just what to do
to become the ‘‘phenotype of the future,’’ the transition
from the old to the new can be perilous. According to
Grove,11 dissenting ideas about the right direction to go split
people on the same team. There is a growing ferocity, deter-
mination, and seriousness surrounding the views of various
participants. Divergent views are held strongly, like reli-
gious tenets. Wars erupt between long-term friends and
colleagues.y c January 2010
TREATMENT OF THORACIC DISEASE
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FIGURE 4. Traditionally, treatment of thoracic disease was vertically in-
tegrated. It was done sequentially by thoracic surgeons. Post Op, Postoper-
ative; ICU, intensive care unit.
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I believe that thoracic surgery education is going through
such an inflection point. As Grove described, it is difficult to
pinpoint just when it began. But clearly and unmistakably,
things have changed. To understand why thoracic surgical
education is of paramount importance, we must first address
thoracic surgery as a specialty.
Thoracic surgery is big and powerful. It financially drives
the American hospital system. Like all big, powerful busi-
nesses it has attracted the attention of people who want
a piece of that business. This fact motivates the development
of one of the most potent external forces of phenotypic
change, the threat that the business you are doing can be
done differently.11 In thoracic surgery, there are many exam-
ples of this threat manifested in a variety of different ways.
To name a few: thoracoscopy done by pulmonologists,
pneumothorax treated by emergency department physicians,
esophageal cancer treated without resection, thoracic aortic
aneurysm treated by endovascular stents, lung cancer treated
with radiofrequency ablation, coronary artery disease treated
with coronary artery stents, valvular heart disease treated by
percutaneous techniques.
These are examples of external forces that are driven pri-
marily by technologies and skills possessed or acquired byTREATMENT O
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ThoracicSurgery
Thoracic Surgery Internists
Thoracic Surgery Hospitalis
Thoracic Surgery
Thoracic Surgery Cardiology
Thoracic Surgery Cardiology
FIGURE 5. Today, treatment of thoracic disease has become horizontally inte
thoracic surgeons but by other specialties. (Figure is not intended to represent sc
operative; ICU, intensive care unit; I/R, interventional radiology.
The Journal of Thoracic andother medical specialties. In addition, however, our specialty
is changing from one of vertical integration to one of hori-
zontal integration. From its onset, and through its heritage,
the treatment of thoracic surgical diseases was vertically in-
tegrated. Each step in the care of a thoracic surgical patient
came sequentially, and each function was performed by
a thoracic surgeon. Thoracic surgeons made the diagnosis
of chest disease, staged it, and determined whether an oper-
ation was indicated. Only our specialty performed the oper-
ative procedures. Postoperatively, thoracic surgeons cared
for thoracic surgical patients in the intensive care unit set-
ting, cared for them on the postoperative ward, and provided
longitudinal follow-up of thoracic diseases. Finally, the
quality of thoracic surgical care was completely within the
domain of thoracic surgeons; thoracic surgeons alone de-
cided what was and was not good quality thoracic surgical
care (Figure 4).
Whether we like it or not, the treatment of thoracic dis-
eases is changing to become horizontally integrated (Fig-
ure 5). The diagnosis of chest diseases is made not only by
thoracic surgeons but by cardiologists, internists, and radiol-
ogists. The preoperative evaluation and staging of the tho-
racic surgical patient is now conducted not only by
a thoracic surgeon but by an internist, cardiologist, pulmo-
nologist, or anesthesiologist. No longer are thoracic surgical
procedures the exclusive domain of the thoracic surgeon.
Vascular surgery, cardiology, interventional pulmonology,
interventional radiology, and emergency department physi-
cians routinely perform procedures that 10 years ago fell
squarely within the exclusive domain of thoracic surgeons.
Postoperative care of thoracic surgical patients is now pro-
vided not only by thoracic surgeons but by nonsurgical in-
tensivists and hospitalists. Longitudinal follow-up by
thoracic surgeons has largely been abandoned in many cen-
ters and delegated instead to nonsurgical disciplines. Finally,
the quality of thoracic surgery is no longer exclusively
within the domain of thoracic surgeons. Instead, what deter-
mines the quality of thoracic surgery is largely determined
by a state or regional database, displayed on the front page
of a regional newspaper without an understanding of its
flaws by the press or the public.F THORACIC DISEASE
Lay Process
PCP Cardiology Oncology
t Cardiology Internists Other
Intensivists Cardiology
I/R Vascular Pulmonology
Oncology Radiology Pulmonology
grated. Each step in treatment of thoracic disease is conducted not only by
ale of all specialties involved). PCP, Primary care provider; Post Op, post-
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FIGURE 6. Specialty of thoracic surgery can change its phenotype only
through mechanisms of thoracic surgical education. Currently, educational
paradigms are adversely affected by many external factors, including
changes in general surgical training, work-hour limitations, and deficiencies
in thoracic surgical postgraduate education.
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when this strategic inflection point in thoracic surgery be-
gan. It did not begin at a precise moment. In retrospect, how-
ever, there have been many indications of a change. For me,
two milestones stand out. First, our strategic inflection point
became crystal clear the first time I saw a thoracic aortic en-
dograft successfully deployed, signaling a change in the
treatment of aortic disease with techniques possessed by
other specialties. This revealed that for thoracic surgeons
to continue to treat aortic diseases, we would need skills
that we did not have. This in turn has triggered a surge in hy-
brid operating rooms across the country. In these hybrid op-
erating rooms, thoracic surgeons team with other specialties
to treat difficult thoracic diseases. This is an example of the
horizontal integration of the treatment of thoracic diseases
that I mentioned earlier.
The second milestone was the appearance of position pa-
pers published in the scientific literature that espoused the
need for intensivists, rather than surgical specialists, to
care for the patients of surgical specialties in the critical
care setting. It has been a cry for intensivists to supplant
the role of the thoracic surgeon in the care of critically ill tho-
racic surgical patients. This, in turn, has triggered the ‘‘clo-
sure’’ of some intensive care units, precluding some thoracic
surgeons from direct postoperative patient care.
The only way by which the specialty of thoracic surgery
can effectively change its phenotype is through the educa-
tional paradigms of thoracic surgical education. Our educa-
tional enterprises must collectively provide the flexibility
and the educational fundamentals to allow surgeons to func-
tion in new ways.
And this is where we are trapped (Figure 6). Thoracic sur-
gical education in the United States is now affected by tre-
mendous external factors. Examples of these factors
include the changes in the current prerequisite for thoracic
surgical education which is a general surgical residency.
One might persuasively argue that general surgical educa-
tion no longer prepares one for thoracic surgical education
in an effective manner. Another external force is the 80-
hour work week; few have any doubt that work hour limita-
tions have significantly diminished the quality of thoracic
surgical education. Another example of such external forces
is that our specialty lacks effective mechanisms of postgrad-
uate education. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
many practicing surgeons to acquire and implement new
surgical techniques.
We cannot let these circumstances determine our out-
come. I have no doubt that to secure the future of the spe-
cialty of thoracic surgery we must first secure the future of
thoracic surgical education. That is my message today. It
is true that thoracic surgery as a specialty is in transition.
In my opinion, to successfully navigate this transition we
must successfully navigate the transition of thoracic surgical
education.10 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular SurgeTHE STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINT OF
THORACIC SURGICAL EDUCATION
Because the specialty of thoracic surgery is changing, tho-
racic surgical education must change. The future of the spe-
cialty of thoracic surgery depends on whether or not thoracic
surgical education is able successfully to navigate this stra-
tegic inflection point, rise to new heights, and reenergize
our specialty. Failure to do so clearly jeopardizes thoracic
surgery as a specialty.
Yet we have been slow to change our educational process.
John Alexander created the first thoracic surgical residency at
the University of Michigan in 1928. For the past 81 years, the
structure of thoracic surgical education has consisted of 1
year, and later 2 or 3 years, of training after completion of
a general surgical residency. During these same 81 years,
thoracic surgery as a specialty has emerged as the leader of
the medical world. Like the leader of any business, we in tho-
racic surgery got to where we are by being good at what we
do, including our educational paradigms. So I think that it is
natural for our specialty to want to keep doing the things that
have historically worked for our specialty. And when the en-
vironment changes, it seems human nature to cling to the se-
curity of the past. Today, however, we recognize the changes
in our environment. We see our specialty changing from ver-
tical to horizontal integration. We recognize the changes in
the requisite surgical skills and the fund of knowledge for
the treatment of thoracic surgical diseases. We recognize
that there are a growing number of ways that what we do
can be done differently. We see objective evidence that our
educational phenotype is maladaptive to these environmental
changes in the declining number of resident applicants in tho-
racic surgical programs. Why are we slow to respond?
It is perplexing that we struggle to react to these changes. I
believe some of this struggle can be explained by irrational
psychologic forces that undermine our specialty’s perspectivery c January 2010
Fullerton Presidential Addressof our world. In their book Sway, the Brafman brothers13 de-
scribe certain psychologic forces that explain the irrational
behavior of individuals, industries, and medical specialties.
Such forces determine our perception of the world and our
responses to these perceptions. Two powerful forces affecting
thoracic surgery are loss aversion and commitment.
We in thoracic surgery have a self-image that is based in
a wonderful history. We have done things a certain way for
a long time. We are proud of our positions in society, in our
hospitals, and in health care as a whole. Understandably we
don’t want to lose any of this, and we therefore don’t want to
change anything that might lose it for us. We have what the
Brafmans refer to as ‘‘loss aversion.’’13
When combined with a second powerful force of emo-
tional sway, that of commitment, the drive to continue our
current mode is potent. We were all drawn to thoracic sur-
gery by its image. As an individual, one can’t get into our
specialty without a very strong sense of commitment to tho-
racic surgery. Once in it, one can’t function in our specialty
without commitment. As a group, we are absolutely commit-
ted to our specialty and more importantly, to our self-image
from what our specialty has historically done.
It is this combination of commitment with loss aversion
that makes it difficult for us to change. It makes it very dif-
ficult, if not impossible for us to see alternatives to our cur-
rent educational paradigms. Our specialty is not unique in
experiencing these emotions. Corporate history is filled
with examples of business enterprises that were either able
or unable to overcome these forces. Those that have been un-
able to overcome them, such as General Motors (GM), have
not fared well. On the other hand, those companies that have
been able to do so, such as Intel, have succeeded.
GM was a global corporate icon. It rapidly came to repre-
sent the supremacy of American manufacturing. It was the
largest and most important company in one of the most im-
portant industries in the world. It produced products that pro-
vided a sense of identity for the individuals who bought
them. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it dominated the
American automobile market with more than 50% of the
market share. It became a company with a confident self-im-
age and corporate culture that it did not want to lose and was
committed to maintain.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, issues of fuel economy
and quality control resulted in a progressive loss of market
share to Japanese car makers, especially Toyota. By 1990,
it was becoming clear that GM needed to change; the way
that it had conducted business for decades was not going
to work indefinitely. It did not completely ignore those signs.
In the mid 1990s, GM introduced an electric car, the EV1. In
1996, GM proudly announced that the EV1 would be in
showrooms in the fall of 1997. But in the end, GM did not
change its phenotype; the company withdrew its plans to re-
lease the electric car. Instead, GM remained committed to its
established phenotype, the sport utility vehicle (SUV). ThatThe Journal of Thoracic and Csame year, hybrid cars were widely available from Japanese
manufacturers and seen by many as the automobile pheno-
type of the future. While the Japanese industry expanded
its innovation into fuel economy and hybrid vehicles, GM
made a strategic decision instead to remain committed to
its SUV phenotype; it bought Hummer in 1999. In an inter-
view given to CNN/Money in January 2004,13 a senior exec-
utive for GM was quoted as saying, ‘‘Hybrid cars make no
sense economically or environmentally.’’ When asked
why GM continued to rely on the manufacture of the SUV
in lieu of more fuel-efficient vehicles, this same executive
was quoted in a 2007 interview with The New York Times
as saying that rich people ‘‘don’t care about the price of
gas’’; GM remained committed to its SUV phenotype.
GM did introduce its first hybrid car, a Saturn, in the spring
of 2008, just before the price of gasoline hit $4 per gallon.
But it was too late; the high price of gasoline finally killed
the SUV market. The world’s economy was flattened in
the autumn of 2008, and automobile sales fell worldwide.
Unable to withstand huge financial losses, GM filed for
bankruptcy in June 2009. Clearly, its reluctance to change
its phenotype led to its collapse.
On the other hand, the corporate history of Intel provides an
important contrast. Intel was founded as a company that made
memory chips, and its self-image was that of ‘‘the memory
company.’’ As the computer industry became horizontally
integrated in the 1980s, its memory chips were an important
component of all computers . By the early 1980s, it had risen
to be the world leader among makers of memory chips. At the
same time, however, the Japanese were developing chip
manufacturing technology that quickly surpassed Intel’s abil-
ity to compete in the memory chip world. By November 1985,
Japanese memory chip manufacturers began to surpass Intel
in market share; it became clear to the leadership of Intel
that their company had rapidly fallen from the world leader
of an industry to a distant follower. Former Intel chief execu-
tive officer, Andrew Grove,11 described the decision by Intel
to change its phenotype in his book Only the Paranoid Sur-
vive. Grove recounted his 1985 conversation with Intel co-
founder Gordon Moore. He asked Moore, ‘‘When we get
kicked out of Intel, and the Board brings in a new CEO,
what do you think he will do?’’ Immediately, Moore re-
sponded, ‘‘He will get us out of the memory chip business.’’
The answer was obvious; they needed to change. He then
asked, ‘‘Why shouldn’t you and I walk out the door, come
back in, and change it ourselves?’’ This is how Intel overcame
the sway of loss aversion and commitment to its self-image as
a memory chip company and became a microprocessor com-
pany. This change was not accomplished easily. As a result,
however, Intel survived, regained its former glory, and re-
mains one of the most successful companies in the world.
By this analogy, what would each of us do if we ap-
proached the door of a current thoracic surgical residency
without the bias of our existing self-image? Would we goardiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 1 11
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is, the young people of today approaching the door of a tho-
racic surgical residency are simply not crossing the thresh-
old. Thoracic surgical education requires change, and we
should change it ourselves.
We must look into the future of how thoracic surgical ed-
ucation should be done, rather than the past of how it has
been done. As advised by the Brafmans,14 only by forward
thinking can we avoid the force of loss aversion. Thoracic
surgical education is clearly trying to navigate itself through
its strategic inflection point. Whether it thrives or not after
this strategic inflection point will be determined by how it
manages this transition. Because it is by definition difficult
to know just what to do to be the phenotype of the future,
the transition from the old to the new can be perilous. An-
drew Grove’s description11 applies to the transition of tho-
racic surgical education. Ideas of what the right direction
should be have split people on the same team. There is
a growing ferocity, determination, and seriousness sur-
rounding the views of various participants. Divergent views
are held strongly, like religious tenets. Wars erupt between
long-term friends and colleagues.’’
No single idea, no single person, and even no single train-
ing program will provide a solution for the specialty. But
people do follow answers. And The Western Thoracic Sur-
gical Association is providing answers. While I do not wish
to overlook the contributions of anyone, I do wish to draw
attention to several members of The Western Thoracic Sur-
gical Association who are leading the way.
Craig Miller has been a driving force behind an effort to
examine thoracic surgical education. He played an important
role in helping to bring all corners of the specialty of thoracic
surgery together to reengineer the Joint Council of Thoracic
Surgery. He and his colleagues at Stanford established the
first 6-year integrated thoracic surgical residency in the
United States. Three more programs have since followed.
The first study to document the decline in thoracic surgery
resident operative experience since the implementation of
work hour limits7 was the recently published study by
John Doty. These data played a prominent role in the discus-
sions at the recent Accreditation Council for Graduate Med-
ical Education summit on resident work hours and were
among the only data available documenting the duress of
thoracic surgical education.
Without question, it is necessary to develop methods of
simulation for thoracic surgery. Simulation will be the single
most important element going forward in thoracic surgical
education at all levels, and Jim Fann has emerged as a na-
tional leader in this regard.
The education of congenital heart surgeons has undergone
a metamorphosis with the establishment of an accreditation
process for the first time. The first such accredited program
was established by Vaughn Starnes and Win Wells at the12 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular SurgeUniversity of Southern California. Today, a third of all of
the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Educa-
tion–accredited programs in congenital cardiac surgery are
in the west: the University of Washington, the University
of Southern California, and the University of Colorado.
Members of The Western Thoracic Surgical Association
have been recognized for their educational efforts as recipi-
ents of national teaching awards from the TSRA. Ed Verrier
is a past recipient of the Socrates Award. Joe Cleveland and
Mike Mulligan received the McGoon Award for 2009.
The new and reengineered Joint Council is now a reality
and will help to shape the phenotype of the future of thoracic
surgical education. Doug Wood was instrumental in helping
to provide the vision for the future of the Joint Council and in
helping to recruit its education leader.
Ed Verrier has been recruited to lead the Joint Council and
is already making an impact as the organization helps to
shape Thoracic Surgical Education at the graduate and post-
graduate levels.
For more than 35 years, The Western Thoracic Surgical
Association has led by example. Its scientific meetings
have been a consistent forum for the expression of innova-
tive ideas. Many of the concepts of modern thoracic surgical
practice have been derived from the membership of the
Western Thoracic Surgical Association. As the phenotype
of thoracic surgical education changes, we may be confident
that it will be members of The Western Thoracic Surgical
Association that lead the way.References
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